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IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT RIGHTS

OF ASSOCIATION
FRANK

H.

EASTERBROOK*

Association with others is part of the liberty of a free people.
Social, religious, civic, political, and economic associations are
essential elements of our society. But where does the right of
"association" come from? The First Amendment contains
three collective rights: the freedom of the press (the exercise by
groups of the freedom of written speech); the freedom of assembly (the exercise by groups of the right to petition for redress of grievances);' and the free exercise of religion (which
frequently is defined by reference to the beliefs of a body of
people). The entitlements to write and to petition in groups
implies a right to associate for the purpose of speaking and
conducting other expressive activity. This is the source of most
rights of association.
Any more general right of association must come through
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Association is liberty; liberty may not be reduced except
by due process; no law that trammels association "too much" is
tolerable. This is substantive due process, that ubiquitous oxymoron. When the Supreme Court identifies a source for rights
of association-once it attributed the genisis of the right to
Tocqueville!-it names the "liberty" of the Due Process
Clauses. But these Clauses mention liberty without saying what
it is, what its sources may be, who defines it, or how much it
"weighs," all important problems once a court starts "balancing." Liberty includes association to run a farm or corporation
and to drink whiskey in a club as much as it includes association
to engage in sexual activities of one's choice. The Court does
not see any problem in the government's regulating farmers'
associations by preventing them from selling milk at the price
they choose, or drinkers' associations, or the methods by
which corporate associations choose their boards of directors.
Curiously, however, certain rights, such as the right to learn
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago. I thank Barry E. Adler, Richard A. Posner, Eric Simonson, and
Cass R. Sunstein for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1886).
2. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 866, 933 n.80 (1982).
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German 3 and to engage in sexual activities with birth control,4
have been selected as "fundamental" rights, liberties that operate as trumps. Most of the constitutional law of association fits
the fundamental rights-substantive due process pattern. 5
The designation of liberties as "fundamental," and the assignment of "weights" for a grand balancing, has no constitutional warrant. Dean Ely has made the point with great
panache, so I need not drone on.' The Supreme Court demonstrates every year why the reconciliation of the values of our
society is a legislative rather than a judicial task. One need only
contrast the abortion and sodomy cases of the 1985 Term.7
The abortion cases took an exceptionally broad view of personal liberty, concluding that a woman's interest is so powerful
that it trumps even a state's effort to provide her with truthful
information; that might influence the choice, which the Court
thought forbidden. The sodomy case took a confined view,
concluding that the public's interest in private morals allowed
it to invade a bedroom and place specified sexual activities off
limits, even though they harmed no one other than the adult
participants, if they harmed anyone.
In one sense this shows only the incoherence inevitable in
the decisions of a multi-member court in which the majority
rules.' Eight of the justices thought the cases presented the
same problem and would have decided for (or against) the
claim in each case. Justice Powell alone saw the cases as different. But he (and so the Court) got the difference backwards.
Sodomy has few if any direct effects on third parties, even nosy
ones. The basis for regulation is moral preferences about how
strangers should behave. This is a sufficient justification for
much legislation; laws may be valid even though they do not
have instrumental objectives. But moral preferences are not as
3. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
4. See Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
5. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-22 (1984) (celebrating a
"right of intimate association" as a branch of substantive due process).
6. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values,
92 HARv. L. REV. 5 (1978). The elegance of Dean Ely's work has not stopped me, however, from taking a thwack at substantive due process and its contamination of the
procedural variety in Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 85. See
also Gumz v. Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1405-09 (7th Cir. 1985) (concurring opinion),
cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1644 (1986).
7. Compare Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986)
with Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
8. See Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802 (1982).
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powerful a basis as is a demonstration that conduct injures unconsenting parties. An abortion may have large effects on third
parties-on the father, on siblings, on grandparents, most of all
on the potential child. One need not think that the fetus is a
"person," a moral rather than a legal question, to know that
effects on third parties are the strongest basis for regulating
"liberty" or associational interests. Fathers and siblings count.
More, states that prevent cruelty to kittens even though some
people may like to torture animals have no less interest in dealing with animate objects that have the potential to lead intelligent lives. The Court's conclusion that political society may not
even try to persuade those whose acts injure third parties
strikes me, no less than it did Chief Justice Burger, as "astonishing."9 The FDA requires pharmaceutical houses to attach
stem warnings to drugs, and judges impose million dollar
awards against physicians who did not adequately warn patients
about the dangers of doing beneficial things. Warnings are
said to help people make informed decisions; they are made
compulsory (despite the autonomy interests in not being
forced to give or hear them) because of concern about the quality of the choice to be made and because of the belief that there
is a right to decide against one's self-interest. These mandatory
warnings, like those required by the securities laws and the statute at issue in the abortion case, are one-sided: They cover the
dangers of a drug or stock or procedure while leaving the benefits unmentioned. (Perhaps legislatures, agencies, and judges
count on the physicians to provide information about the benefits of their services.) While warnings about trivial risks have
become mandatory, warnings that might influence an abortion
have become interference with physicians' autonomy. 10 This
sounds like nothing so much as the old claim that wage and
hour laws interfered with the autonomy of bakers to work as
long as they wanted for a pittance. It is hard to take seriously,
especially from a Court that held that the state may influence
abortions by refusing to subsidize them."
9. Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2190 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
10. i at 2178-80.
11. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). Again, it's hard to criticize "the Court."
The lineup was the same as in the sodomy case (with Justice O'Connor replacing Justice Stewart). Only Justice Powell sees differences among these cases. See also Block v.
Meese, 793 F.2d 1303, 1312-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.) (discussing the ways in
which the government may use speech to influence private decisions).
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Now all this may seem unfair. I am criticizing substantive due
process, with or without its "fundamental rights" embellishment, which is an old whipping boy. Maybe the implied rights
of association have a firmer base in the First Amendment. The
right to speak and petition would be worth less if it did not
include a right to associate with friends and business (or sexual) partners. Business talk and pillow talk are still talk. The
corporation makes economic activity more efficient; so to association makes political activity and expression more effective.
This is the sort of argument Justice Harlan used in NAACP v.
Alabama,12 the first case to recognize a constitutional right of
association implied from one of the three rights listed in the
First Amendment (or from the definition of a substantive right
that necessarily requires cooperative activity). Alabama wanted
to bust up the NAACP, which was speaking and petitioning all
too effectively for the segregationists' tastes. The Court replied
that association is protected as an implicit constitutional right
to the extent it makes the explicit constitutional right more valuable, and that the Constitution forbids steps, such as finding
out who belongs to an unpopular group, that reduce the effectiveness of the association.
Everyone applauds that decision. The government may not
snatch away express constitutional rights by regulating to death
the ancillary activity or preparatory steps. I am nervous when a
case is so easy. The rights we all come to like are also apt to be
protected by legislators. Not all the time; nothing works all the
time (the judicial process misfires too); but often enough. If
"everyone" endorses a particular aspect of liberty, it is easy for
the Court to say in the aberrant case (the one when the legislature has not acted) that the judges are the true guardians of the
"spirit" of the people and may produce what an "enlightened"
legislature would have done. It is easy to slide from this to a
conclusion that what the judge values is what "the people"
value; then the judge knows the "aberrant case" by the inaction
of the legislature when the judge's values are endangered. The
process uses extreme hypotheticals, followed by a statement
that the case at hand is the camel's nose. 3 We would be re12. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Fellman, ConstitutionalRights ofAssociation, 1961 Sup.
CT. REv. 74.
13. See Gewirtz & Johnson, The Jurisprudenceof Hypotheticals, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120
(1982).
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pulsed by legislation restricting who we may befriend, invite to

dinner, or marry; we would be terrified by legislation limiting
political associations that are necessary to keep representative
government healthy; therefore judges must ensure that legislators cannot get away with passing obnoxious laws restricting
freedom of association.
To put this slightly differently, easy cases, popular and obvi-

ously right cases, may produce dangerous doctrines because
they establish the principle that the Constitution allows the
judges to do whatever the legislatures ought to have done. The
court that sets off on this path may discover, as legislators
through the ages have discovered, that it can assemble a powerfil constituency out of minority groups. A political body that
can satisfy an intense minority here and another intense minority there will be protected by its constituency even if time and
again the body injures the majority's interests. This is the insight behind the new economics of regulation, 4 and what is
true for elective political bodies is equally true for appointive
political bodies.
The easy case allows judges to establish doctrines that collapse the judicial and legislative processes. Doctrines that look
straight through the text, structure, and history of the Constitution to the "values" underlying that text-and that then use the
"values" as the direct support for decisions-enlarge the
power of the Court so greatly that it becomes a political body.
These doctrines assume that the political and moral philosophy
underlying the Constitution is the Constitution. The text, from
this perspective, is but an imperfect expression of the governing political and moral premises. Now values in political and
moral philosophy are indeterminate; what does each "weigh,"
and when must it yield to some other interest? 5 These questions, which have produced ceaseless contest among philosophers for as long as there have been philosophers, are also
among the gravest questions confronting conscientious legislators. In NAACP v. Alabama the Court meant: "We protect association to the extent it protects constitutional values." The only
14. See Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGT. Sci. 3
(1971); Peltzman, Towarda More General Theory ofRegulation, 19J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976);
Becker, Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs, 28J. PUB. ECON. 329 (1985).
15. For more in the same vein, see Easterbrook, Legal Interpretationand the Powerof the
Judiciary, 7 HARv.J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 87 (1984); Easterbrook, Method, Result, andAuthority,
98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985).
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way to carry out the program implied by this decision is to decide whether you like of the purposes of the association.
It is therefore no surprise that the NAACP wins, that people
affiliating to influence political candidates win only in part,' 6
that people whose associations exclude blacks and women
lose,' 7 and that until a change in public opinion led to strong
legislation the Court cheerfully concluded that association by
workers in unions was a conspiracy against the public weal.', In
the case holding that the Jaycees' freedom of association did
not allow them to associate only with men,' 9 every justice assumed that there is an implied right to associate to make business friends and generate camaraderie and then essayed
whether the Jaycees' exclusion of women helped its members
realize their objective. The Court had to assess the importance
of the Jaycees' objectives, to themselves and to outsiders, and
the importance of the competing objectives and interests that
led to the legislation requiring civic organizations to admit women. The result was a cross between the program Jeremy Bentham would set for a legislature and the program a consulting
firm would set for the Jaycees themselves. The Court essentially concluded that a consultant would have told the Jaycees
that the exclusion of women was not in their interest; therefore
the government was free to interfere with their right to choose
their associates. One passage even suggests that any aspect of
an association's creed that is contary to the wishes of society
may be treated like violence and suppressed without regard to
its effects on associational freedoms.20 If this is the Court's
view, then association has constitutional protection whenever
the legislature chooses to leave it alone-which is to say, it has
16. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

17. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (state may require a
group to admit women); BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983)
(government may penalize groups that exclude blacks by denying such groups tax ex-

emptions, although other associations receive exemptions); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976) (government may compel private schools to admit blacks).

18. E.g., Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Assoc., 274 U.S. 37
(1927); Lawlor v. Lowe, 235 U.S. 522 (1914). Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103

(1937), one of a series of cases that upheld the Wagner Act and marked the turnabout,
is notable not only for its result but also for the dissent ofJustice Sutherland, id, at
133-41, invoking freedom of speech and association as obstacles to the regulation of
the employment relation.
19. Roberts, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
20. Id. at 628-29.
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none whenever the Court, speaking for "society," approves of
the legislature's objectives.
The malleability of claims based on "association" is evident
in cases dealing with the organization of political parties. On
the one hand parties have been allowed, because of their associational interests, to conduct their internal affairs largely as
they please, even if states want candidates nominated in some
different way.2 1 On the other hand, the Jaybirds, a private association formed to hold a pre-primary-a system that operated like a holding company and allowed a minority of the party
to choose the party's candidate-were told that they must allow
black voters to participate.2 2 The Jaybirds wanted to make
their speech and association more effective; their system did
that; the Court used the effectiveness of their association as the
hook to compel them to associate with people they wished to
exclude. The changes in the effectiveness of the group and the
ideas it would peddle in society were viewed as good reasons to
abridge the group's implicit right of association. The upshot is
that "normal" political activity-that is, activity that does not
seem to carry out a strong or unpopular agenda-is protected
as association, while forms of association that are unusual or
have an unwelcome agenda are not protected at all. This comes
closer to the outcome of a legislative process than to general
rules protecting association.23
Perhaps this skepticism makes me the Grinch Who Stole
Christmas. Association is popular and important. Private associations are more than refuges in which people may operate
autonomously. They are centers of power, counterweights to
Leviathan. Totalitarian states tear down or dominate private associations. But our Constitution not only does not "enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics" 24 but also does not choose
between capitalism and communism. States may decide that
power should be held by collectives or the government rather
than by private associations, be they called corporations or
21. E.g., Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda,
419 U.S. 477 (1975); San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm. v. March Fong
Eu, 792 F.2d 802, 812-16 (9th Cir. 1986).
22. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
23. The same can be said for the "right of privacy," a close relative of the right of
association. See Beaney, The ConstitutionalRight to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup.
CT. REv. 212; Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup.
CT. REV. 173.
24. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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dubs. For most people economic rights-where to work, at
what price to buy milk or rent apartments-are more important
than whether the Jaycees admit women or whether a political
party must seat the delegates selected in a primary rather than
a caucus. Economic rights are entitlements over resources, and
through things one's surroundings and comfort; they are personal liberties to the same extent as other forms of freedom.
People who cannot control inanimate objects, either at all or
against competing claims by others (even if all affected people
agree) are not in control of their destinies. Liberty in economic
matters is an important ingredient of political liberties. 5
Judges no longer quarrel with the right of the legislature to
decide economic entitlements. Why are other associational
rights different? Perhaps it is that free association is especially
important to the intellectual and economic groups from which
judges are drawn. Intellectuals feel free to regulate the economic lives of others but resist the regulation of the most important elements of their own lives. The same people who
would fight to the death to keep regulation off the back of Stanford University (unless Stanford holds stocks of corporations
that do business in South Africa, or perhaps does a little defense research) would not hesitate to deny a liquor license to
any Moose Lodge that excludes women.
There is no principled way to distinguish regulation of association for economic reasons from regulation of other forms of
association. We have never had a principled theory of the appropriate scope of regulation of non-economic association.
And we can't get such a theory from the text of the Constitution, which does not deal with the subject, or from its history.
The Framers wanted to limit the influence of private associations (factions) through the separation of powers and indirect
25. Many of the Framers thought that preserving property and economic rights was
the purpose of civil government. E.g., FEDERALIST No. 10 U. Madison); 1 RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

533 (Farrand ed. 1911) (statement of Gouvernuer Morris);

McConnell, Contract Rights, Property Rights, Factionalism and Faction (draft Sept.
1986) (collecting cites). The Court sometimes sees that personal and property rights
are the same. E.g., Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). One need
not believe every argument in Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom (1968) or Friederich Hayek's The Constitution of Liberty (1960) to conclude that political liberty depends on liberty in the associations and interactions we call "economic." See also R.
NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); Director, The Parityof the EconomicMarket
Place, 7 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1964); Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1977).
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elections. 26 None of the history in England or the colonies
hints at a general protection for private associations. None of
the colonial charters or constitutions addressed the subject.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights does not preserve private
associations. No state asked the First Congress to put anything
about association in the Bill of Rights-although there was a
proposal on almost everthing else one could imagine. Even the
intellectual foundation of associational freedoms is weak. John
Stewart Mill's On Liberty2 7 was about the tyranny of private
opinion, about the dangers arising from private associations
more than the dangers of government. The climate in the
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries exalted individual rather
than associational freedom.
Yet for all this NAACP v. Alabama cannot be escaped. To say
that individual people have rights must mean that there are
limits on the state's ability to interfere with steps, including collective steps, that lay the groundwork for the exercise of those
rights. The government could not ban the publication of newspapers by corporations or the association of people to influence legislation. The problem, as I have emphasized, is not the
first step but the successive steps-extensions in which the first
step rather than the Constitution is the premise. We get a form
of constitutional rumor chain, in which the conclusions bear no
resemblance to the original rules. Implicit rights of association
should be based directly on the three explicit rights in the First
Amendment, not on undefined "liberties" mentioned in the
Fifth and Fourteenth. Otherwise we have simply told judges to
apply Jeremy Bentham's felicific calculus and to decide as wise
legislators would. When the liberties and their values are stated
at a sufficiently high level of generality, this approach transfers
all of the hard decisions to judges. Much as the Federalist Society should like free association, much as all free people like association, we must accept as the price of representative
26. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10 & 51 (1. Madison). See also Sunstein, Interest Groups in
American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 223
(1986). This does not mean that the courts are to undercut the work of legislatures
dominated by faction; Professors Sunstein and Macey, who take this view, confuse a
hoped-for result of the constitutional structure with a warrant for judicial action to
thwart legislation that survives the constitutional obstacle course. But I agree with their
position that the plan of the Constitution was to reduce rather than augment the
power of private associations over governmental choices.
27. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (London 1859).

100
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government the risk that our representatives may not always
value freedom as highly as they should.
The line I have been trying to draw is the one between the
inference of rights from the constitutional structure and the
creation of rights on the authority of the word "liberty." The
Constitution has form as well as words, and that form may be a
source of entitlements. That is why the First Amendment must
protect the right to listen to a speech even though the language
refers only to the speaker's rights; any reference to speaker's
rights supposes that listeners, if willing, may get the benefit of
the speaker's views. A judge's task is to find those fundamental
suppositions in the structure of the document that reflect the
assumptions of the time it was written. It is the method of Marbury v. Madison,"8 Gibbons v. Ogden,2 9 and much else. This
method vindicates the result in NAACP v. Alabama and many of
the other cases involving claims of associational freedoms.
The problem for a judge asked to annul a legislative decision
is one of justification, of the kind of reason that counts as a
judicial reason. A judge whose answer rests on the text, structure, and history of the Constitution can give a good justification for views that differ from those of the legislature-text,
structure, and history are external to the judge's preferences
and bind legislators independently of the reasons the judges
give. Decisions based on "liberty" cannot meet this criterion,
for they require the judge to select among values and to resolve
tension when values clash-more an exercise in moral philosophy than in interpretation. It is a subject for political choice. As
the method of establishing an entitlement is removed from the
text of the Constitution-as it comes to rest on undefined liberties and values rather than on rules laid down-the judge's
claim to give the authoritative answer fades. A judge must invoke a decision external to his preferences; it is not enough to
be wise. It is doubt about the authority of judges to have the
last word, not doubt about the value of associational freedom,
that leads me to ask whether there is much constitutional support for the "freedom of association" that is so important to us
all.

28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

